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THE AMBIGUITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: A
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR BICKEL
JEROME A. BARRON*

In the past two decades, we have witnessed the flight of system
from law, the decline of precedent, and the use of litigation for broad
social, rather than traditional private, purposes. For some, the new
social cutting edge of judicial process is a matter of regret. For
others, the same phenomenon is hailed as a means to stabilize the
political order and to energize the moral order.
How did the American judiciary come to be a front line of social
revolution? Partially the answer lies in the desperate quality of
contemporary protest, in its sense of the futility of expecting much
from other branches of government. But partially the answer lies in
the very ambiguity of the judicial process itself. Imprecise lines
demarcate the jurisdiction of courts. There is an abundance of
alternative doctrine in American case law which makes generalized
prediction hazardous. The variable reactions of acceptance and
defiance which characterize public response to judicial decisions have
become tools to equip the courts for a heightened political role.
The ambiguity which characterizes the judicial process generally
is shown in sharper focus in the Supreme Court's role of passing on
the constitutional validity of governmental action and
legislation-the act of judicial review. Today when the Court
postpones judicial review or when it exercises it, the Court affects
the entire political system. Despite this effect, it is nearly impossible
to generalize about constitutional law at the present time in the
manner of nineteenth century constitutional law writers such as
Story, Willoughby, or Cooley. But the decline of the general theorem
in constitutional law has paradoxically proven to be a source for the
Court's power to act individually, extra-bureaucratically, and
creatively.
Increasingly, the use of law in courts to achieve social reform
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and even social revolution in the United States has undermined the
traditional associations the courts have had with the ideals of
neutrality, objectivity, and detachment. In his Holmes lecture at
Harvard in 1959, Professor Herbert Wechsler said that the Supreme
Court should not use political methods but instead neutral principles
of constitutional law. It is true, he said, that the approach to politics
by most of us is essentially instrumental. But however tolerant we
might be of such an approach to politics we expect something else
from courts
How can neutral constitutional principles be developed?. Not
many would suggest that these principles be gathered from an effort
to historically ascertain what the Framers intended by a given phrase
in the Constitution. History is as much art as science. Similarly,
history is mischievous. Moreover, even if capturing the historical
understanding were less elusive a task than it is, obviously we could
not be bound by even the most accurate reading of history. The
meaning of constitutional language, in a vital and restless
constitutionalism such as ours, cannot be deciphered forever by an
eighteenth century glossary. Similarly, case law or precedent cannot
be a very adequate or productive guide to the development of
principles by which to decide new issues presented to courts. Many
of the problems presented today either have never been judicially
resolved or, if they have arisen in the past, were considered not to
be judicially determinable.
Order and system, form and structure have either fled or been
banished from the university, the Church, and ordinary life. Resort
to the individuated approach, to the single context, parallels a
development in law similar to that found in existentialism and in the
New Theology. The phenomenon which is known as Naderism, and
which speaks so vividly to the idealism of the young, obtains its
principles from the urgencies of the moment. Certainly, the social
necessities of the inner city exert more urgency, more vibrant reality,
than can possibly be commanded by appeals to adherence to the
traditional conceptions of the judicial process.
The Supreme Court has been the most visible example of the use
of judicial process as an energizing source of social change. But the
Supreme Court's example has been mirrored by lesser courts
1. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 14-

15 (1959).
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throughout the country. When Kruschchev told the Soviet people
that Stalin was not a hero, iconoclasm did not stop in Russia with
that exposure. Similarly, the iconoclasm practiced by the Supreme
Court has been imitated by other tribunals.
Professor Alexander Bickel of Yale, in a more recent Holmes
lecture at Harvard in 1969, has suggested that the dominant motif
of constitutional interpretation during the life of the Warren Court
was the Idea of Progress. In his lecture, Bickel chronicles the
disappointing (to him) consequences of the Warren Court's endeavor
to achieve social progress through the process of constitutional
interpretation 2
When courts approach politics, should they use principles which
have a life apart from the political problem which is being litigated?.3
If principles are selected to meet the exigencies of a moment we
should not be startled to have that principle come back to haunt us.
A principle of law should not be created for a specific case but the
specific case should be susceptible to a general principle. Certainly,
this is classic and beguiling doctrine. It has the impartial sound of
justice. But can the problems we really care about be solved without
reference to the problems? Is it possible, or desirable, to create
principles apart from specific problem John Dewey condemned for
an earlier generation of philosophers the mischief done by the
assumption of classical philosophy that the world of thought
occupied a separate and higher plane than the world of practical
concern.'
We see, and we continue to see, both the de-intellectualization of
law and a decline in the ideals of impartiality and generality. Judicial
integrity in Anglo-American law, in the past, could be defined as the
measure of the impartial distance between the problem at hand and
the principle applied to resolve it. If even-handed principle is the
measure of decision rather than the result to be obtained, reason
rather than will shall have prevailed. But judicial integrity is a fragile
2. A.

BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
3. Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHI. L.
Rev. 661 (1960), made a penetrating legal realist critique of the difficulties in a completely
principled approach to judicial problem-solving:
The point emphasized here is that there are no facts apart from a theory, and that
accordingly, a person's view of the facts is unavoidably colored by the nature of that
theory. Neutrality, thus, is unattainable in the constitutional adjudicative process, both
on the level of [legal] principle and on the level of the facts of the dispute before the
Court. Id. at 681-82.
4. JOHN DEwEy's PHILOSOPHY, The Quest for Certainty. 301 (Ratner ed. 1939).

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970:591

and subtle thing. Suspicion always endures that it was some
submerged preference which in the last analysis really selected the
even-handed principle. Chief Justice Taft did not think he was using
an even-handed principle when he found the child labor tax beyond
the taxing power of Congress.5 If a statute was a real taxing measure
Taft said he would uphold it; if it was not a real tax he would strike
it down. Our contemporary suspicion is that what Taft cared about
was -not the creation of a calculus to isolate true taxes from false
taxes but to restrain social legislation of which he disapproved.
Constitutional philosophies have more than superficial
resemblance to theological speculation. In the United States, natural
law problems are subsumed within the text of the fundamental law
itself. They surface in judicial opinions which flesh out constitutional
phrases such as due process, liberty, and equal protection.
What usually unites Supreme Court critics is an intrepidly
rationalistic approach. They demand a certain standard of judicial
performance, a certain deference to the formalisms of constitutional
litigation. In that sense they are aestheticians in their criticism. As
one of their number, Professor Kurland, puts it, they are Jobbists.
They see carved out for the Court a little job, not a large one, but
a manageable one, a task capable of standards.
Bickel and Wechsler want to depoliticize the Court. They seek
to tame it, they wish its subject-matter to be defined rather than
open-ended. Professor Wechsler demands that the Court's doctrines
be principled in the sense that they have a logical coherence, a
coherence that makes the Court's operations capable of withstanding
the rigors of logical analysis. Alexander Bickel's tool for
depoliticizing the Court has a quite different emphasis-an emphasis
on abstinence.
Wechsler argues for a methodology which transcends politics.
Bickel's approach is easier to implement and therefore, not
surprisingly, more revolutionary. He doubts that politics can be
expelled from constitutional litigation which is conceived in politics.
Not content to banish a political approach to constitutional cases,
he wants to banish political cases. Bickel doubts the possibility of a
5. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U S. 20 (1922).
6. Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive
Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. REv. 143, 144-45 (1964).
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"pure" theory of judicial review. Therefore he urges the cultivation
of what he calls the passive virtues
Wechsler's approach like most ideal theories is somewhat too
ethereal for the real world of American judicial review. But Bickels
critique cuts far deeper. If political cases are to be avoided, the
Supreme Court, as the political institution it has become, is
challenged root and branch. That challenge requires us to look at
what politically the Court does before we can assess the wisdom of
such pessimism.
Like the New Critics in literature, Bickel and Wechsler predicate
their criticism in the text and structure of judicial literature itself.
The difficulty with this approach is that it enormously decreases the
role of the Supreme Court in American life. Bickel is really making
a radical request: if the great political cases are incapable of
principled resolution, then the Court ought to decline decision of
such cases. But it is the great political cases which have made the
Supreme Court, historically and now, a branch of government.
What is the meaning of this desire for depoliticization? On one
level, it is an anguished plea for the self-restraint which, it is argued,
ought to animate a formally undemocratic institution. On another
level, it reflects a sense of outrage that one's discipline is in the hands
of the unworthy. But this aesthetic and intellectual cri de coeur is,
from a historical point of view, somewhat surprising. The Supreme
Court has always played a double-faceted role: a role both political
and legal. In cases displaying social tension and ambiguity, it is
inevitably a political body. It is this political fact which some critics
and some politicans are determined to expel.
Like the eighteenth century rationalists, the Supreme Court
critics posit some Golden Age where a truly objective
constitutionalism flourished. In this imaginary Golden era, which is
presumably the American past, judicial decisions were reached with
a detachment and disinterestedness entirely apart from politics and
the intimidating considerations of the moment.
Judicial review was conceived in 1803 while Marshall was
rendering a political slap at the new Jefferson Administration It
was a prologue which set the mold. Even those of the Court's
famous cases which manage to present a "principled" aspect are
7. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS

BRANCH 113-18 (1962).
8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).

596

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970:591

easily shown to be political at base. In the Dred Scott case in 1857,
Chief Justice Roger Taney said for the Supreme Court that the
constitution would not allow slavery to be kept out of the newly
settling West.' The decision is an excellent illustration of the
limitations of "principled" decision-making and of "passive
virtues" as well.
Taney's view that slaves were property and therefore assured to
their owners by the fifth amendment had textual support beyond the
fifth amendment. Taney pointed out that specific provisions of the
Constitution demonstrated that the words of that document were not
intended to embrace the slaves. The Constitution signed by the
Framers contained a clause reserving to the original thirteen states
the power to import slaves until 1808. In another clause, the states
pledged themselves to maintain the right of property of tle master
by delivering up to him any slave who may have escaped from
slavery if he is found within their respective territories.10
Superficially, the Dred Scott case is a good sample of the art of
principled decision-making. Professor Edward Corwin wrote of the
case: "[l]n asserting for slave property a position within the
Constitution equal to that of any other kind of property, the Chief
Justice was entirely within the right, his Free Soil and Republican
critics to the contrary notwithstanding."'"
But, politically, the Dred Scott case had the "earmarks of a
southern tour de force." The situation was so vividly political that,
as Corwin reminds us, Mr. Justice Grier, a Pennsylvanian, was
prevailed upon by President-elect Buchanan to join the "majority of
his bretheren. 12 The plea was designed to underplay southern
affiliations of the justices who comprised the majority. What then
was the source of decision in Dred Scott? Political expediency or
constitutional principle?
Bickel's response to the Dred Scott case is entirely consistent
with the emphasis he places on abstaining from the political. He
quotes Professor Maurice Finkelstein who said of Dred Scott: "'A
question which involved a Civil War can hardly be proper material
for the wrangling of lawyers.' "' Apparently, Bickel would deal with
9. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
10. Id.at411.
11. E. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REvmw 145-46 (1914).
12. Id.at 132.
13. A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 184-85.
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Dred Scott not by a vain effort to apply "neutral principles" but
by wresting the case away from the "wrangling of lawyers" entirely.
This distaste for lawyers' wrangling is rather pointlessly squeamish.
Dred Scott was a significant factor in legitimizing the expansion of
slavery. The case furnished a new source of legitimacy to the
advocates of slavery and new proof of the insolubility of the problem
as far as seditionist sentiment was concerned. For Bickel an issue so
tensely political as the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise
reflects the inherent "strangeness of the issue and its intractability
to principled resolution.""
Bickel asserts as a reason for adherence to the political question
doctrine "the anxiety, not so much that the judicial judgment will
be ignored, as that perhaps it should but will not be.""
Dred Scott, it is true, was a tragic decision and a portent of more
tragic things to come. Perhaps Dred Scott illustrates that the Court
has occasionally chosen the wrong politics. Can that kind of error
be avoided merely by asking the Court to shun political choices?
Suppose the Court had said that the Constitution did not prohibit
slaves from becoming citizens. Perhaps then the "wrangling of
lawyers" would have saved a war. If the Supreme Court in Dred
Scott expedited the coming conflict, a different choice might have
defused it.
The criticism that there are some questions too political for the
wrangling of lawyers makes an interesting contrast when
counterpoised against remarks of the late Mr. Justice Jackson. In
his book about judicial review which he wrote while he was SolicitorGeneral, Jackson pointed out that "struggles over power that in
Europe call out regiments of troops, in America call out battalions
of lawyers."" Jackson wrote of Chief Justice Taney that "he, more
than any other" had played "the tragic part" in causing the
conflict. Jackson believed that the Dred Scott case was a factor in
"precipitating the Civil War.' 7
In 1803, in Marbury v. Madison Chief Justice Marshall asserted
for the Supreme Court the power to exercise judicial review; a
section of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 was declared
unconstitutional. Until Dred Scott in 1857, no other federal statute
14. Id. at 184.
15. Id.

16. R. JACKSON,
17. Id. at 327.

THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY xi (1941).
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was annulled by the Supreme Court. Jackson said of this experience:
"The first step was as shrewd and successful as the second was
reckless and disastrous.""
What in the balance of history does the Court's experience with
judicial review actually teach? The Court's political achievement
should be weighed with that historical detachment which should be
used to assess all social and political institutions. The Court's
failures, contemporary and past, should not be used to disparage
present and prevent future successes.
Are judicial process and political strategy incongruous? Lon
Fuller has written that one of the criteria which operate to place the
moral force of a judgment at its maximum is where "the judge
confines his decision to the controversy before him and attempts no
regulations of the parties' relations going beyond that
controversy."' 19 This also is the objective of those who seek a
principled approach to law.
The price of a possible judicial success is bought at an exchange
of briefs and arguments. As against the matching of guns and blood,
it is a slight expense. If in addition to that expense some damage is
done to the harmony of an aesthetically satisfying constitutional
methodology, that again is not an intolerable burden. But critics of
the political uses of judicial review are not willing to tolerate the
burden. Why? They believe that having yielded the integrity of their
craft the political solution may fail as well. Judges in our system do
not determine whether slavery can be expanded to the western
territories but whether the slave, Dred Scott, shall be returned to his
master.
But is there not an approach that lies between choosing a politics
indifferent to principle or divorced from life? The Supreme Court is
only occasionally a political forum. The Court, like the other
branches of government, may occasionally be the means of
successful politics. Sometimes it will happen that the Court will have
to do what the frankly political branches are unable to do.
The exploitation of a judicial process which cleaves to principle
but which has an eye on life is the distinctive contribution of
America to politics. The Supreme Court of the United States is not
just another high court of a federalist state such as the Supreme
18. Id. at 24.
19. L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS

OF JURISPRUDENcE

706 (temp. Ed. 1949).
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Court of Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada is in the main
concerned with matters of private law, questions of tort, contract,
and estates. Relatively little of its total caseload has reference to the
basic instrument of Canadian federalism. Most important, the
Supreme Court of Canada certainly does not regard itself as a coequal branch of the federal government of Canada.
But the Supreme Court of the United States has had a political
role from the beginning. The Court's political weapon is "the law,"
and particularly the Constitution, just as the weapon of the Congress
is the purse, and that of the Executive, its monistic unity. But
acknowledgment of the Court's political task is resisted. A stubborn
insistence on certainty, the quest for which has been largely
abandoned in other disciplines, survives in constitutional law. The
Nixon administration has introduced as its nominees for the
Supreme Court men the President describes as "strict
constructionists." Burger, Haynesworth, Carswell; and Blackmun
have each been defended by the Administration on the ground that
they would read the Constitution as it was. It is a strange survival,
this quest for certainty in constitutional interpretation. President
Nixon stated that the Supreme Court justices he most admires were
Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo. But these justices would have been
the last to have insisted on unchanging rules of constitutional
construction.
Holmes, for example, viewed the judicial process itself with a
biting realism. In 1896, while still a justice on the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, he expressed his skepticism: "The true
grounds of decision are considerations of.

.

.social advantage and

it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely by logic
and the general propositions of law which nobody disputes.""0
The grievance that Holmes had against the Court of his day was
that it had set itself up against popular will and against the future.
He thought it inevitable that the Court should reflect contemporary
social realities. What he could not fathom was the pretension that
it could be otherwise. Holmes is revered by those who have watched
with some anxiety the Supreme Court's ascent to a position as a
major force for social change. Holmes has been admired by such
different men as Mr. Justice Frankfurter and President Nixon. The
reason for this appeal is a judicial mind which is not in the service
20. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92,44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
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of any ideology but which nevertheless grasps the essence of each
passing ideal with trenchancy and detachment. For Holmes it was
inevitable that the Court would reflect the dominant politics of the
moment.
Usually what is being praised in Holmes is the possession of
temperament for judging. When as a Supreme Court Justice he was
called to review the case of the Communist, Benjamin Gitlow, he
wrote to this friend Harold Laski of the "drool about proletarian
dictatorship," 2' but he also wrote in the United States Reports that
there was nothing in the Constitution to prevent the dictatorship of
the proletariat if that is what the people wanted.22 For Holmes,
neutrality was not a judicial ideal, nor an ideological imperative, it
merely was the consequence of a profound skepticism. That the
Court should or could transcend the rising ideologies of an epoch
was something Holmes as a judge neither expected nor required.
Dred Scott is not the only illustration of the abiding tension
between law and politics which has been displayed across the docket
of the Supreme Court. There are other examples as well of the
advantages a political approach will always have over an aesthetic
one. In 1941, the Supreme Court at last decided what previously the
Court had denied: federal wage and hour legislation could
constitutionally be applied to the manufacture of goods in interstate
commerce.P Alpheus Mason writes that Archibald Lovett, one of the
lawyers in the case, had waggishly remarked that if the Court had
decided the matter one hundred years earlier it might have avoided
the Civil War.2 What he meant was that if it had been constitutional
for Congress to prohibit the traffic in slave-made goods in interstate
commerce, then slavery as an institution might have died a more
natural death. It is an intriguing thought. It suggests once again that
the political capacities of Supreme Court decisions should neither be
scorned nor denied.P
Henry Steele Commager was one of the students of American
history who have given particular attention to the work of the
21. HoLmEs-LASKI LETTERS, 1916-1935, at 752 (M. Howe ed.).

22. Gitlow v. New York, 268 US. 652,673 (Holmes& Brandeis, J.J., dissenting) (1925).
23. United States v. Darby, 312 US. 100 (1941).
24. A. MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 554 (1956).

25. For a survey of the range of views and debate concerning contemporary judicial review,
giving particular attention to political science criticism, see Deutsch, Neutrality. Legitimacy,
and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L.
REv. 169 (1968).
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Supreme Court. His complaint is not that the Court is in politics

and should not be. His attack is broader. From the point of view of
what Ralph Gabriel called America's democratic faith, the Court
has too often been on the wrong side. Commager hits judicial review
where it lives. He argues that judicial review has simply not justified
itself in the protection of minority rights from majority action!'
As the advocate of the people's liberties, how distinguished a
record does the Court have? Commager argued that the idea of the
Court as the tribune of the people is not historically justified. The
cases he relies on are cases where an illiberal legislature infringed on
civil liberties and was either upheld or only mildly chastised by the
Court. But the historical achievement of the Warren Court, however,
was not secured by assaults rendered by a radical judiciary on a tory
legislature but by its capacity to create and develop doctrine and
policy which the legislature was either unable or unwilling to affirm
or deny. By refusing in 1948 to allow the courts to enforce a
restrictive covenant against a willing white seller and a willing Negro
buyer, the Supreme Court established a national policy that the state
could not submit its institutions to racist uses. 7
Commager thought that individual liberties were too precious to
be dependent on the ability of litigants to surmount the technical
rules of constitutional law?' Yet in recent years the Supreme Court
has become remarkably adept at dealing with the ingenuity of state
legislators. The Court has managed to bring private
action-theoretically outside the fourteenth amendment-within its
mandates?' In 1959, five years after the school desegregation case,
the public schools in Prince Edward County, Virginia were closed.
In 1960-61, the Virginia legislature established a program of tuition
grants.to be used by children attending private schools. At the same
time, the Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors provided for
property tax credits for contributions to any nonprofit, nonsectarian
private schools in the county. The public schools elsewhere in
Virginia were open.
The school officials in Prince Edward County read the School
Desegregation Case closely: The enforcement of segregation in the
public schools through law was forbidden. Suppose there were no
26. See generally H. COMMAGER, MMorrvt RULE AND MINoRrm RIGHTs (1950).
27. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
28. H. COMMAGR, supra note 26, at 72.

29. Cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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public schools at alP Would the School Desegregation Case then
have no subject upon which its hated command could work? The
Supreme Court pierced the subterfuge and held that when a state
permitted a county to abandon public schools and to operate private
schools with state and county assistance for the sole reason of
ensuring that white and colored school children in Prince Edward
County would not attend the same school, such state behavior
amounts to state action prohibited under the fourteenth
amendment?
Professor Commager believed that judicial invalidation of state
legislation should not be undertaken by the Court because it is
largely a technical exercise which the states can just as well
technically circumvent. In the fall of 1969, the Supreme Court
declared in a stern decree that enforcement of the School
Desegregation Case of 1954 could no longer be denied' Throughout
the South today, variations on the Prince Edward County theme are
to be found. This despite the existence of the Prince Edward County
case. Isn't Professor Commager's point therefore particularly
cutting? Heavy reliance on judicial process is not wrong as a
philosophic or legal or an institutional matter but simply-and there
is no criticism more fundamental-because it doesn't work.
For Commager, American government is the record of a
tradition of faith in majority rule. Over-frequent recourse to the
courts to heal tormenting social problems is in defiance of that
tradition. Commager concedes that the history of Negro rights has
been the great reproach to the utility of reliance on the tradition of
majority rule. But nevertheless he says the solution does not lie in
the courts. The racial problem is in his view a matter for "the
processes of education." But to say that "the procedures of
education have not gone far enough" implies that judicial decisions
and popular education are mutually exclusive? 2 The lesson of the
School Desegregation Case is that the law is a teacher. The southern
reaction to the Supreme Court School Decree of 1969 is far quieter,
less aggressive, and more reserved than it was to Brown I in 1954.
The judicial ban on legal segregation has been itself a major
determinant in affecting social attitudes as the enactment of the most
30. Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
31. Alexander v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 19.
32. H. COMMAGER, supra note 26, at 61.
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significant body of federal civil rights legislation since
Reconstruction illustrates.
The schools of a Virginia county went "private" and thereby
hoped to escape constitutional duty under the fourteenth
amendment. But a revolution in judicial response to problems of
constitutional law has weakened the feasibility of such avoidance.
This indifference to the formal structure of a discipline is an
illustration of a general pattern of skepticism about received
traditions in our contemporary culture. The creative force of
American constitutional law is not toward recreating some vanished
legal world of form, order, coherence and neutrality. Rather it is
motivated by an instinctive feel for resolving the concrete problem.
American constitutional law has gone existentialist. There is a new
candor about the human essence of constitutional interpretation and
a new awarness and avowal of the delusive character of quests for
transcendence or objectivity.
But this new candor may make it easier for the Supreme Court
to switch back to judicial conservatism. The radical thrust of the
present Supreme Court seems to be losing its intensity. Warren
Burger has replaced Earl Warren. Abe Fortas has resigned and been
replaced by Harry Blackmun. Some of the other sitting Justices are
elderly and will soon be replaced. The Warren Court of the sixties
may prove to be only a radical interlude. Similarly, Congress may
yet erase some of the work of the Warren Court in racial matters
and criminal procedure as an earlier Court erased the civil rights
legislation of the Reconstruction Congress.
Whether this relapse occurs or not the history of the American
Supreme Court demonstrates that judicial review is ideologically
hospitable to the reality not only of reform but of reactioii. The
unnerving theme in the record of American judicial review is its
ambiguity. From Alexander Hamilton to William Howard Taft, the
idea that the judiciary should be the brake on the future is something
that has been embedded in American conservative thought. But in
recent years the judiciary has acted as a spur to the future.
Professor Bickel argues that "the Court is the place for
principled judgment" or else "its insulation from the political
process is inexplicable." 33 It is my suggestion that the political
process and the judiciary are not like Hindu castes forever barred
33. A. BICKEL, supra note2. at 87 (1970).
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from contact with each other in our system. Nor are they assigned
to caste functions which prohibit the assumption of new tasks or the
abandonment of old procedures. Rather the judiciary is designed to
have occasional political uses. The divorcement that Professor Bickel
seeks would remove a forum for social change too useful and too
important to justify limitation of the work of the Supreme Court to
matters always susceptible to and always governed by principled
judgment "disciplined by the method of reasoning familiar to the
discourse of moral philosophy."" Such an approach assigns to the
Supreme Court a task at once too grand and too trivial.
Constitutional law of all things should not be fitted into an atavistic,
platonic dichotomy between the real and the ideal.
Ambiguity should not be thought of as an indication of a new
failure of integrity in the practice of constitutional law. A concern
for integrity, both for the survival of the basic political structure,
and for the explication of basic constitutional themes, free expression
and racial equality, are stamped in much of the contemporary work
of the American judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court ,andthe
lower federal courts. In the borderland, between law and politics,
new uses for the corrective capacities of courts continually arise. But
there are uses-for uncertainty. As the public becomes more
acquainted with the uses of judicial process for radical social change,
public awareness increases that the paths a court can travel in
decision are not set by a very clear compass. A new candor arising
from the tension in the political and social order has destroyed the
old apparatus of legal and constitutional certainty. But integrity is
apparent amid the rubble.
The enormous resiliency, the constant possibilities for modest
advance and subtle retreat, makes the Court one of the most sensitive
sources for social change in the United States.
34. Id.

